

Economics for Princes

1 Introduction

In the middle of the thirteenth century Aristotle had already become so popular in the West because of his physics and metaphysics that the medieval scholars wanted to find and study his complete practical philosophy too. So far only his *Ethics* (*The Nicomachean Ethics* DN) was known to themⁱ. By then the three-partition of the practical sciences had been generally accepted, so the learned monks expected to find still a *Politics* and an *Economics* from his hand. The two books became rendered in Latin by William of Moerbeke (c. 1215-c. 1286), a Flemish Dominican friar who worked in Greece. He translated the *Politics* of Aristotle around 1260 and 'his' *Economics* in 1267. The last book actually was the one of Theophrastus which we discussed in Chapter 2. Unfortunately the translations of William were not easily comprehensible, because he had rendered the originals word for word and preserved the Greek word order, some Greek double negatives and even an occasional Greek wordⁱⁱ.

In 1269 Thomas of Aquino (1225-1274)ⁱⁱⁱ started to write a comment on the translation in Latin of the *Politics* by William in order to make this work of The Philosopher, as Aristotle in the meantime had become mentioned, intelligible. Thomas had to stop with his effort three years later, when he had finished only books I and II and the chapters 1-6 of book III. The rest of Aristotle's *Politics*, just like 'his' *Economics*, will be purified by others, which effort will take some decennia^{iv}. During the last quarter of the thirteenth century, before the whole of his *Politics* and 'his' *Economics* was edited and became gradually spread over the universities, the Thomas-version of *Politics*, book I-III, 6 by Aristotle was read and used intensely by the medieval authors and teachers.

Now in book I of his *Politics* Aristotle answers some question regarding economics, where in books II-III, 6 he purely discusses political problems. So students and teachers of the artes faculties of the first universities from say 1275-1300 read *The Politics* of Aristotle as a text that consists of almost 50% 'original economics' (*Politics*, I) and a good 50% politics proper (*Politics*, II and III, 1-6). In that period the second practical science certainly becomes known as such in university circles and receives its scientific status in the artes faculties of the universities, because of its presence in *Politics*, I of The Philosopher.

Giles of Rome (ca. 1245-1316) reconstructs an economics too. Not from a need to write an encyclopaedia but from his wish to write a mirror of princes for the French King on the basis of Aristotelian material, after he had to leave the University of Paris. As a teacher at the university he had become very well versed in The Philosopher but in 1277 he had been thrown out, like many more professors who taught Aristotle. The King must have offered him an income to write this book. Interestingly, Gilles uses as much Aristotle as possible in this practical philosophy for princes and kings, despite the reserves of the bishop of the diocese of Paris. 'Mirrors of Princes' are a traditional genre of textbooks which directly instruct kings or lesser rulers. Often they were composed at their accession. This tradition had arisen in Persia or maybe even earlier in India and was passed on to the Byzantine as well as the Arab Empire. In Western Europe the writing of mirrors for princes had been practised for the first time in Carolingian times and this habit was resumed in the 12th century. Two of them, a Ps. Aristotelian tract *The book of the secret of secrets* (*Secretum Secretorum*) and this work by Giles of Rome *About the government of princes* (*De regimine principum*) will become immensely popular in the late Middle Ages.

In *About the government of princes*, however, the subject of the princely government of his house has a prominent position, for the author dedicates the whole second part to it. By doing this Giles has contributed substantially to the growing popularity of original economics in Western Europe.

About the youth of Giles of Rome not much is known. Once he had entered the Order of the Hermits of St Augustine^v he was sent to Paris to study philosophy and theology. At that university he studied and taught the philosophy of Aristotle. This lasted until Giles, like many of the personnel of the

University of Paris, became a victim of the condemnation of the work of Aristotle of 1277 by the bishop of Paris^{vi}. He left the university and wrote this mirror of princes, which he dedicated to the future King of France, Philip IV, The Fair. From 1281 onwards Giles became active in his order in Italy and 1292 was elected its superior-general. In 1295 he became archbishop of Bourges^{vii}. This great scholar died in 1316.

2 Summary of *On the government of the house, part II, of the About the Government of Princes* by Giles of Rome

1.1 (p. 214-218)^{viii} *In this second book then is determined the government of the house. With a family, however, the house is a kind of community, and a natural community at that: if we want to determine characteristics of the house, we have to look in what way man is communicative and social. One should know that man above other animals needs four things, from which we can investigate in a fourfold way that he is communicative and social.* (p. 214) He needs other people in the first place, because in opposition to the other animals he prepares his food, *and never, when a man lives alone, would he have for himself the sufficiency of suitable foodstuffs, which are required for living.* (p. 216) Then he needs others to provide for his clothing. Thirdly he needs other people to defend himself and to make weapons for his hands, which other animals do not use for this purpose. *According to the Philosopher in De Anima, III the hands are the tools of tools.* (p. 217) Finally man has speech, which he uses for instruction. This he needs because in opposition to the other animals his instincts do not work properly. The possession of speech is one of the reasons why Aristotle calls man a political animal in *Politics*, I. He even wrote there: ‘a man who chooses a solitary life, is not a part of society, but either a beast or God.’ One should not take this too literally but indeed, such persons are too bad or they want to spend their lives in contemplation and leisure, *and then are in a way divine.* (p. 218) In both cases the solitary man is unable to contribute to society.

1.2 (p. 219-221, 5) Someone might strongly doubt if the community by which we get enough food and clothing, and the other goods that are necessary for a living is the domestic one, because in *Politics*, book I Aristotle writes that *the community of the house is not sufficient for the whole life, because for that purpose is invented the city-state*, (p. 219) This implies that the necessities for a living, which a house or a quarter cannot supply, are provided elsewhere in the city-state. There is a connection between house and city indeed. The kingdom, the city and the quarter presuppose the house and the house is the origin of them as Aristotle writes in *Politics*, I. [p. 220, r 20-225: Giles explains *Politics*, I, 1253 a 19-1253 a 29 in which Aristotle says that the house comes before quarter, city and kingdom in some respects but not in other ones. This explanation is necessary because Aristotle not only calls the house but also the city-state ‘the primary community’.] *If all other communities presuppose the house and a special community is necessary for providing enough for a living as such, then it follows that the house is necessary.* (p. 221)

1.3 (p. 221, 5-225) ‘House’ has two meanings. *The house on which one mainly is directed in the moral profession is not the building itself but the communication of the persons of the house.* (--) *Economics has to determine the degree to which one has order with respect to the house, which is a community of persons* (p. 222)^{ix} Now kings and princes have to govern the state as well as to navigate the house-affairs, with an eye on their political and social responsibility, just like citizen do, but they have also to take care very well of their goods and family, because kingdom etc. presuppose the house. *From their part the commoners and everybody who lives within a kingdom should know how to govern their house, not only in as far as this government is private good but also to the degree that such government is organized towards the common good, that is the good of the whole kingdom and the city.* (p. 225)

1.4 (p. 226-228). *Now we want to tell something about the community of the house.* (p. 226) Some activities are daily ones, as those that we need for every day, like eating, drinking. Others occur once in a while, like *buying and selling* (p. 226) Aristotle means with `formed for all day` that the house is formed for activities during the day, the activities that occur every day. Because in one house are not found all the necessities for living, the house-community has to communicate with other houses in the quarter. The next community is the city. Eventually the principality or kingdom was invented to fight the enemies, which is more successful with a confederation of several castles and the existing cities under one prince or one king. *This then is the order: the house is the community according to nature, formed for all day* (p.227); the quarter provides for the non-daily activities; the city is formed for total self-sufficiency and the kingdom for common defense. Of course the community of the house exists of several persons, otherwise it would not be a community at all and neither would communities within the house be possible.

1.5 (p. 228-232) The Philosopher says in *Politics*, book I, that the house in the first place exists out of two communities, namely the community of the husband and wife and the one of master and slave. This can be proven by taking into consideration, what is most natural: creation and the conservation of what is created. *Creation cannot be seen without conservation, because something what is generated is brought about in vain, if it in some way cannot be conserved in its being.* (p. 229) *Now the community of husband and wife is meant for creation and the community of master and slave for conservation.*(p. 230) So the house exists out of a community for generation and one for conservation. [Because the second part of this statement is not self-evident Giles explains it on p. 230-231.] With this two communities come three sorts of persons; men, women and slaves or something which replaces a slave. *That is why The Philosopher in Politics, I appreciatively cites Hesiod as saying that a house exists of a man, a woman and a plowing ox.* (p. 232)

1.6 (p. 233-237, 5) The third community of the house is the one of father and children. [p. 233-236, 5: Giles proofs that this third community within the house is necessary for it to be perfect.] So within a perfect house three communities exist. *Now where in the community between man and wife the man has to be the first in rank and the wife following; in the one between father and son the first has to be giving orders and the second obeying without protest and in the third one, the master is commanding and the slave implementing and serving, in a perfect house (as the Philosopher says in Politics, I) exist three kinds of government as well.* (p. 236) One may easily see also that the three are four types of persons and six roles. Because there are three kinds of government in the house, *it is not difficult to see that this book should have three parts.* (p. 237)

1.7 (p. 237, 5-240) *Of the three kinds of government first the conjugal government has to be discussed, because according to the Philosopher in Politics, I in the community of the house, first should unite male and female.* (p. 237). In order to deal with this subject in an orderly way, I am going to cover firstly the institution of marriage and the selection of the wife by the citizen and especially princes and kings *Then we are going to show how husbands should govern their wives and to which virtues and to which activities they should organize (Lat.: ordinare) them.* (p. 238) *The Philosopher says in his Ethics, VIII that the relationship between man and woman is a kind of friendship and a natural one at that.* Then he adds a threefold reason why man is a conjugal animal by nature: Firstly man is more a domestic than a political animal [p. 238, 5- 239, 5: Giles explains the content and validity of this short argument by The Philosopher.] Secondly all animals have the natural urge to produce one's similar and men should do this in marriage. Thirdly *husband and wife at the outset divide their labor; the jobs of the man seems to consist in treating (Lat: agere), what is made outside the house and the wife in conserving the household goods or working up (Lat.: operare) some goods inside the house.* (p. 239) By combining their efforts they provide enough for both of them for a living, as *Ethics VIII* says^x. [p. 240: Giles argues on his own account, that adultery should be avoided.)

1.8 (p. 241- 243, 5) *The philosophers prove furthermore, that marriages should be indivisible.* (p. 241) They provide two reasons. If a natural friendship exists between husband and wife as The Philosopher in *Ethics*, VIII writes, it would not be true friendship if fidelity between them would not exist. In this

way the example from early Roman times has to be understood in the *Memorable Deeds and Sayings* of Valerius Maximus^{xi} of a barren wife from whom her husband wanted to divorce but was not permitted to do so, *because the desire for children is not more important than conjugal fidelity*. (p. 241/2) The second reason for the indivisibility of marriage are the existence of children. The word 'community' implies that what is common binds. Parents have children in common so offspring is a binding force in marriage. The philosopher touches on this argument in *Ethics*, VIII, where he says, it is true, *that sterile marriages easier dissolve but not that they should dissolve*. (p. 242) The love of parents for their children is very strong and the stronger it becomes, the stronger becomes the wish to stay together too. Both reasons are relevant for commoners and for princes and kings even more, because if they do not take special care for their children, this may damage the kingdom.

{p. 243, 5- 249): Giles spends two chapters (1.9 and 1.10) on arguments against polygyny (one husband has several wives) and polyandry (one wife has several husbands). Something princes and princess did at the time?}

1.11 (p. 250-252) That a too narrow consanguinity between a couple is against the prescripts of reason *may be found out along three ways, namely by looking into the respect that one has to show to one's parents and relatives; into the good that comes from a marriage and into the bad that is avoided by it*. (p. 250) As to respect, all people forbid sons to marry their mother, because the subject, the mothers, then becomes the subjected, the wife. So children should not marry their parents out of respect. Furthermore between married couples does not exist the same degree of respect as between close relatives of the blood. So, again, close relatives should not marry because it brings a loss of respect, *unless in special cases they have gotten dispensation*. (p. 251) As to the good that comes from marriage. From marriage comes peace and concord, but this is already present in relatives, so for them this good would not come from marriage, so why would they then marry? The final argument is the bad that is avoided: by marriage one restricts oneself to one person so the vice of lust is controlled. For kings and princes a marriage in the third and fourth degree is possible, if dispensation is given.

1.12 (253-2.55,5) *The good things are goods of the soul, like virtues and good behavior, and goods of the body, like beauty, friendliness, agility and the like*. (p. 253) The last ones are called exterior goods. *Here they are classified in three kinds, because honorableness of lineage, a large number of friends and a multitude of riches are reckoned among the exterior goods, as The Philosopher shows in Rhetoric, I*. (p. 253) Kings and Princes have to check if the person with whom they want to marry, has enough of each of them for they should marry into a honorable family, which implies a lot of honorable and powerful friends. Money is a kind of by-product. The spouse has to be from an honorable family because society requires that the prince realizes a dignified and equivalent marriage. A plurality of friends is important because it contributes to peace and peace keeping is an important task of the prince or king. *Now one uses to ask from the wife a dowry and wealth to cover the costs of the marriage and to have enough for living*. (p. 255) The wealth, and possessions, however, that kings and princes achieve for their sustenance often already is so abundant, that they can afford to look first at the nobleness of her family and the amount of friends. *These three things then are to be sought but according to the measure of proportionality, so that between the spouses a certain proportionality is maintained as well with respect to the soul as to the body*. (p. 255)

1.13 (p. 256-259, 5) Having shown all this, *still has to be said, how the wives of precisely honorable men should be equipped with exterior goods of the body as well of the soul*. One has to know that *The Philosopher writes in Rhetoric I, when he enumerates the goods of women, that their goods of the body are beauty and height, (Lat.: magnitudo) while those of the soul are self-control and love of being busy without slavishness*. (p. 256) That beauty and height have to be sought for is proven in this way. *More important than the possible organization of marriage towards its contribution to society, to peace and to the sustenance of life, are its organization towards the production of offspring and the avoidance of adultery* (p. 256). Now we see that *height of the body is expedient for good offspring*. (p. 257) With all animals large parents produce large offspring. The same goes for man. *Secondly has to be looked in the wife for nice forms and beauty, because these too bring good offspring*. (p. 257)

Beautiful parents get beautiful children. A second reason to look for beauty in the wife is that the inclination of the husband to have sex with other women declines, if his wife is beautiful. *Now still has to be shown that that self-control and zest for work have to be sought in her. Well, that good has to be sought in the woman which is the opposite of what she is maximally inclined to.* (p. 257) Self-control is important, *because (as we have explained extensively in book I) with it she moderates those passions, to which women are maximally inclined.* (p. 258) They should also love to be active, because idleness will bring people more easily to what the ratio defends. *For the human mind cannot do nothing as the Philosopher says in Politics, VI* ((p. 258) So if it is not occupied with good and permitted activities, it will wander off to bad thoughts.

1.14 (p. 259, 5-262, 5) *We can in two ways investigate that wives is are governed differently from children:* (p. 259) the manner of governing and the government jobs. The argument from the manner of governing unfolds this way. Man is called 'the smaller world', because he is governed by one principle, his ratio, just like the cosmos is governed by one principle too: God, the pure and separated intellect. *Plato saved in some way part of the complete order of the heavens in the rational soul*^{xiii}. (p.259) If already this one principle is reproduced in man, the more so it will be reproduced in the city-state and in the house. *Therefore The Philosopher compares in Politics, I the ways in which the city-state is governed with those applied in the house. A city-state (at least nowadays) is governed in two ways: a republican (Lat.: politicus) or monarchical way.* (p. 260] He also in his there puts the republican government on par with the conjugal one in the house and the monarchical one with the paternal way, in which is dealt with children. *The husband has to take the lead towards the wife in a republican way, because this is prescribed by positive [civil DN] laws and the [canonical DN)]marriage law and by customs and agreements, according to which he has to reign.* (p. 260) Conventions and agreements do not play a role in the father-child relationship. There the father is free to do what he likes. Moreover the paternal way of governing is more natural, because children just happen to be born, while the conjugal government is rather a matter of human agreement. So the two kinds of governing in the house are different, *the paternal one being total and natural; the conjugal one restricted and out of free will.* (p. 261) The second argument derives from the difference in the government jobs. *The father has to lead the house in such a way that he organizes the sons towards other tasks than his wife.* (p. 261/2) The sons are educated so that, once adults, they will be able to perform military and civil functions. This is not the job of governing the wife.

1.15 (p. 262, 5-264) *Still has to be shown how the government of the wife differs from the one of the slave. In three ways can be shown that one should not use one's wife as a slave* (p. 262). The first argument is the order in nature. God has created nature in a perfect order. *Because something is maximally ordered when one person is ordered to perform one duty and because the wife by nature is ordered to produce children, therefore she is not ordered to be a slave. That is why the Philosopher in Politics, I says that wife and slave are by nature distinct for (as The Philosopher says there also) nature makes nothing as the cutlers make the Delphic knife.* (p. 263) Now The Philosopher says also in *Politics, I* that with some barbarian people the wife has the same rank as a slave but one has to understand that with barbarians he means people, who do not use their ratio and not simply neighboring people for in our time Germans and Englishmen do not use their wives as slaves. The second argument is that a house has to be perfect. *A house, however, where wife and slave have the same function seems not to be perfect and to have a lack of goods and not to be able to provide for its living.* (p. 264). This explains why The Philosopher says in *Politics* that the poor, who do not have a mass of slaves or an abundance of the goods that are necessary to have a perfect house, use their wives and children also as slaves. The third argument is that equality has to exist between husband and wife. *The husband should be leading, because of his better use of his ratio, but this does not mean that the imparity between the husband and the wife should be such as that she is used as a slave, but rather as a partner.* (p. 264)

[p. 256- 269, 5: Giles spends one chapter (1.16) to explain the fragment in *Politics*, VII, xiv, in which Aristotle argues that one should not marry too young. and a shorter one (1.17) on the fragment that enters into the subject of the proper time of conception. They are not summarized DN.]}

1.18 (p. 269, 5-272) *It has to be told here, be it shortly and succinctly, which are the praiseworthy and the reprehensible things in specifically women.* (p. 270). In women is praiseworthy in the first place that they are diffident. This has two causes: their desire for praise and the timidity of their heart. Their desire for praise comes from their imperfection. Just like the clerics who are imperfect in science like to be praised about the knowledge they command more than those who really are learned, women, who are less perfect in virtue than men, like to be praised more about their virtues, often the virtues of their body. This diffidence of women can also be explained by their timidity. *They are by nature so timid, that almost all frightens them.* (p. 271) Secondly is praiseworthy in women that they usually are pious and compassionate. Children and the aged are also compassionate but not for the same reason. Women possess this character trait because their heart is weak. *In the third place has to be taken into consideration with women that they generally are overdoing things; when they are pious, they are too pious, etc.* (p. 272) This way what may be praiseworthy in good things, is reprehensible in bad ones. *We can on the other hand relate three reprehensible things of women.* (p. 272) First they are immoderate and followers of their emotions, because of a shortage of reason, unlike the man who uses his reason completely. By the same cause they are quarrelsome. The ratio does not maximally function as a bridle for women. So when they start fighting they do not know how to stop *for we see them continue quarreling longer than men.* (p. 272) Thirdly women are capricious and unstable which happens because of the weakness of their frame. *The soul follows the body and because they have bodies that are soft and unstable, as to their will and desire they are also volatile and capricious.* (p. 272)

1.19 (p. 273-275, 5) *One should know that there is one common rule for all governing: who wants to govern something well should take special precautionary measures against what in his view this thing mostly lacks* (p. 273) So some philosophers teach that people who are not eloquent, have to make special efforts to pronounce difficult texts. Applying this rule to the government of the wife and *having seen in the former chapter that they usually are immoderate, quarrelsome and unstable they have to be lead towards self-control, taciturnity and stableness. Now self-control consists (as is said in the first part) of four elements, namely chastity, honesty, abstinence and soberness.* (p. 273/4) Chastity is not only important because of the loyalty indebted to the husband but also because of the procreation of offspring. *It the wife does not serve chastity, it may easily happen that the own son of the man will not receive the inheritance of his father.* (p. 274) This is an important argument for kings and princes, where illegitimate offspring can be an important cause for fights. Honesty is important too, for flirting suggests that a woman looks for an opportunity for unchastity. Abstinence of food and of soberness as to alcohol bring people easily to sex and therefore should be avoided too. Initially wine was even unknown to the Roman women, as Valerius Maximus relates in his the second book, which deals with early customs. Citizens have to instruct their wives and apply the precautionary measures themselves; the nobility has to employ a housekeeper for this. As to taciturnity, *The Philosopher says in Politics, I that taciturnity is the ornament of the wife.* (p. 275). *She should be taciturn, because taciturnity is becoming her and serves to enlarge the love of the husband for his wife.* (p. 275) She also should be stable, because the more constant and firm she is the more she will convince her husband, that she maintains the indebted loyalty. *The wives, therefore, have to be governed with such a regime that they are strong with regard to the six^{xiii} mentioned goods.* (p. 275)

1.20 (p. 275, 5-278, 5) *It is not sufficient for Kings and Princes, and in general all commoners to know how to govern their wives and to which virtues to lead them, if one does not also know how to behave oneself at her side.* (p. 275) Three things are relevant here. *In the first place they [husbands D]) should use them [wives DN] moderately and discretely* (p. 276). There are three arguments against immoderate sex. The frequent use of the genitals is bad for the bodies, included that of the husband, *because the generative power gets exhausted and (as The Philosopher says in Ethics, III) lust is insatiable* (p. 276). When this maximally is satisfied, one wants more than nature requires and the body cannot recover itself. *That is why superfluous sex damages brains, sight and other noble parts.* (p. 276) Then, not only the body becomes debilitated but the mind too, because the body is -so to say- a tool of the mind and if the body becomes weaker, to the same extent the mind can use the ratio less.

Finally the more one abandons oneself to the sexual acts, the more lust one gets, because that is how passionate things work, as The Philosopher says in *Ethics*, VII. They have to know as well, that sex should be practiced at the proper time, in the convenient place and on the right way, *so that the friendship between the couple not only is pleasurable but also honorable*. (p. 277) Secondly the husband should enable his wife to maintain the proper magnificence. If he wants his wife to show the same status as he does, he should give her the necessary garments. A wife is so closely connected to her husband, that the honor he makes possible for his wife, strikes back at him. She is not his slave but his companion and this should show. The third element of adequate behavior at her side is proper conversation. This means that he *shows the indebted signs of his friendship and instructs her by the indebted admonishments* (p. 277). What is due in this respect depends on the situation and the character of the wife. If for instance a wife is humble one should show more signs of friendship to her than when she is proud, because if one shows friendship to proud women *they will want to reign over their own husbands*. (p. 278) In the same way the instructions to a prudent wife will differ from the admonishments to a silly one.

1.21 (p. 278, 5- 281, 5) *Kings and princes, and in general all commoners have to know which line to take with their wives as to the embellishment of the body*. (p. 278) Otherwise they will not be able to lead their wives towards honest and permitted actions. *Because women maximally endeavor to look beautiful, they mainly make mistakes with the embellishment of the body*. (p. 278) With the example of Sparta The Philosopher shows in *Rhetoric*, I that women, who aim at what is not permitted, call out bad over the city-state. *One has to know that the embellishment of the wife consists of two elements, of which one may be mentioned artificial and the other one non- artificial*. (p. 279) All kinds of make-up are artificial, because they *make women more beautiful than they actually are*. (p. 279) The clothing and adornment, which corresponds to the status of the husband, are not artificial but when modest permitted. Therefore Valerius Maximus writes that the citizens of Rome provided their wives with beautiful cloths and other ornaments. *This then is how embellishment has to be judged. But if we want to instruct the wives themselves* (p. 279) how to deal with this subject a warning has to be given: usually with garments two sins are committed: overabundance and shortage. Andronicus Peripateticus^{xiv} in *On Virtue* suggests against overabundance three virtues: humility, temperance and simplicity. Humility means to dress oneself not for vainglory but to make oneself beautiful for the husband, so that he keeps away from other women. Temperance comes down to dressing oneself in correspondence with the status of the couple. In this respect *the wives of noblemen are more adorned than those of ordinary commoners* (p. 279) and those of kings and princes even more. Simplicity means the absence of too much zeal. A default in dressing may be caused by laziness and negligence as well as a desire to be applauded because of one's visible poverty in clothing. In *Ethics*, IV The Philosopher blames the wives of Sparta for this last vice.

1.22 (p 281, 5-282) *Many men seem to make the mistake that they are too jealous of their own wives* (p. 281). This is not something praiseworthy for three reasons. First the husband gets stressed, because he is in a permanent state of suspicion. Secondly the women get incited to evil, *while prohibition always augments the desire. For, as is said in Rhetoric, II desire exists for what is absent*. (p. 282) This kind of desire is a vice. Thirdly quarrels and disorder between them arise in the house, because the wife is accused without cause and the husband expresses his suspicions without foundation, incapable of suffering in silence. That he should not be too jealous does not mean that he should not watch her and not have any jealousy. It should be the proper amount of jealousy, which makes that *between them will exist a natural, honorable and pleasurable friendship*. (p. 282)

1.23 (p. 283-284, 5) *The judgment of women is weak, according to Politics, I, because, like children, the female has an imperfect deliberative faculty, because it has shortcomings in comparison with the perfection of the man*. (p. 283) On the other hand she reaches earlier perfection, because The Philosopher explains in *About Animals* that all lesser and weak beings reach their perfection earlier. *So generally speaking the judgment of men is better than that of women (--) but at times the female judgment can be better than the male one*. (p. 284)

1. 24 (p. 284, 5-286, 5) *We can investigate along three ways that women generally and mostly are not able to keep secrets.* (p. 284) The three arguments to prove this are that their reason has shortcomings, that their heart is soft and that they always pursue praise. The reason argument is that women cannot keep secrets because the prohibition as such causes in them the desire to disclose them more than men. The soft heart argument says that women think that somebody is their friend, once she is friendly to them. The pursuance of praise finally makes them reveal secrets in confidence. This may be often the case, but one may observe as well that *some women do keep the secrets that they should.* (p. 285) Therefore the truth is that *men should not disclose secrets to their wives, unless they have experienced day and again that their wives are modest, prudent, stable and no spreaders of secrets.* (p. 285) As to the proper activities of women, *because we will pay attention to them later, we will now let this subject go.* (p. 286)

Part II book 2: *In which is discussed how parents - with regard to their own children - take care of them.*

2.1 (p. 287-289, 5) *Because, as is said in Politics, I, the government of the house takes more interest in humans than in the emotion of the inanimate^{xy}, and in freeman than in slaves therefore we decided to discuss the principles of the government of the children earlier than the government of the slaves* (p. 287), although the last one is larger task. With this subject we first want to show that *parents should be concerned about their children. For if the concern one should have about one's children is known to them, they will be more stimulated to govern their children well.* (p. 288) These are the three reasons. Firstly, parents are the origin of their children and nature makes sure of the survival of what it has created. Secondly parents stand above their children, so they have the responsibility to govern their children, like God takes care for the whole universe and the heavenly bodies govern what is on earth. Thirdly a natural friendship exists between parents and children. So *because a natural love exists between parent and child, as is proven in Ethics, VIII parents precisely because of the natural love they have for their children, take care of them.* (p. 289)

2.2 (p. 289, 5-291, 5) Certainly princes and kings should be concerned about their offspring. The first argument why they should be more concerned than the common man is the one of intelligence. The Philosopher writes in *De Animalibus*, that to the degree that animals are more intelligent, they have more concern for their offspring. In his *Ethics* he writes that it is natural that anybody loves his own work. So, princes and kings, to the degree that they are more intelligent and know children are theirs, are supposed to be more concerned about them than the rest. Secondly the children of kings and princes should have more strength as to moral goodness than others, because in *Politics*, II The Philosopher writes that people with the highest position and dignity should be the moral and intellectual best. Therefore those children of kings and princes, who are going to be governors, need the concern of their parents for an education that they become the moral and intellectual best also. The third argument is the one of the interest of the kingdom. *The quality of a kingdom depends on the goodness of them who are in the kingdom and maximally of the goodness of the prominent persons in it, like the health of the body is dependent on the health of all members and maximally from the health of the heart (--).* (p. 290) So the parents have to be concerned about their children that they as future rulers will behave prudently and morally good.

2.3 (p. 291, 5-293) *We can in two ways retrace that the paternal government takes its origin from love.* (p. 292) Natural order proves it. *The Philosopher says that nature has given the procreative power to things, in order that those who are not capable of continuing themselves, are able to reproduce themselves in others, who are like them.* (p. 292) This is the case with parents and children. *To love these similars is natural too* (p. 293). So the natural order teaches us that the paternal government takes its origin from love. The second argument comes from the perfection of the father. *According to the Philosopher something is perfect, when it is capable of producing its similar.* (p. 293) Children are the perfection of their parents. *Because everybody loves his perfection, of course the father loves his children, being the proof of his perfection.* (p. 293) Thus, *because he has a natural love for his son, a*

father takes care to govern and control him (p. 293) If somebody uses his children as slaves, his house is imperfect. The probable reason for this is that the father is poor, as The Philosopher says in *Politics*, VI, so that he cannot afford a mass of slaves.

[In 2.4 (p. 294-297) Giles explains the passage which shows the difference in the mutual amount of love between parents and children in *Ethics*, VIII. Not summarized DN]

2.5^{xvi} (p. 298-300) *Along three ways can be shown that commoners, and certainly kings and princes have to take care that their children are taught belief from early youth onwards.* (p. 298) Firstly this is the right age to accept the kind of knowledge which is a matter of authority. *Young children, when their father or mother propose them something to believe, are not yet looking for the meaning of the words, because they miss still the use of the reason, but they accept what is being told to them.* (p. 298) Secondly religious truths are simply to be accepted, because they are higher truths than those of reason. They get their authority from God, in whose divine prudence we can trust more than any rational argument. If religious truths simply have to be believed, we should teach them to children in the age that they are credulous. The third proof comes from the fact that the truths of religion have to be adhered to in a firm way. The more something is habitual, the more it becomes natural and the more we adhere to it. *We are more used to the things on which we sweat when young than the other ones* (p. 299), so that in order to adhere firmly to religious truths, they have to be proposed to us in early youth. The problem too is that one later is exposed to all kinds of fables and ridiculous prescripts, so children had better be taught the Christian faith as early as possible. It is enough to teach children the belief by way of a broadly outlined summary. [p. 300: Giles specifies the basic religious truths, which should be taught to young children.].

2.6 (p. 301-303, 5) If all commoners and maximally kings and princes *are concerned about inheritance and money so that they can support their children as to the bodily needs, much more they have to be concerned that they will get a perfect soul and accustomed to virtues and good habits*, (p. 301) for the soul is more important than the body. *We can in a fourfold way retrace that children have to be instructed in good habits from their childhood onwards:* (1) One has the argument from pleasure: The Philosopher says in *Ethics* that it is natural to keep enjoying what we have begun to enjoy in our early youth. *If then in early youth the desire for pleasure starts, this has to be resisted from early youth onwards too* (p. 301), (2) There is also the argument from the shortage of reason: the best state of the soul to be brought to good behavior is one where one is inclined to playfulness and subject to passion and this is the case in the age of youth, as The Philosopher shows in his *Rhetoric*. (3) The third argument is based on our strong inclination to do the bad. At the end of *Ethics* The Philosopher shows how much time it takes to straighten a twisting twig. This endeavor may be compared with the education of children. (4) The final argument is the one from the habit of the opposite. Because children are regularly brought to bad habits, while this is easy, because children are soft and following, especially the young ones *from early youth on need admonitions and the right corrections, to keep them from licentiousness.* (p. 303)

2.7 (p. 303,5-306,5) All people should be able to read, because reading *makes one more prudent and therewith more capable of preventing what is forbidden.* (p. 303) The poor are excused, because they need to work for their necessities and do not have the time for reading. *Nobles, however, and maximally kings and princes, who possess an abundance of riches and possession, should no doubt be reprehended if they are not concerned with the government of their children in such a way that from early youth onwards reading and writing^{xvii} are given to them.* (p. 303) Along three ways one may approach that one should start reading in early youth. In the first place one needs to know Latin above the vernacular, because it is the only language which expresses the reality satisfactorily, which is the reason why all scholars use it. It is already important in order to speak the vernacular correctly, to start practicing it from youth on, so certainly we will not be able to speak Latin correctly, unless we start to learn it young. The second argument is that study is not possible without attention and effort &) The Philosopher in *Politics* writes that those activities give us more pleasure, to which we are used in our youth, & *what gives us the most pleasure we do with the most attention and effort* (p. 304), from which it follows that one should start reading when young. *The third way is taken from the perfection, which*

is required to master the sciences (p. 305) People are not really equipped for science. *That is why The Philosopher in On the soul, I states that the soul spends more time in ignorance than in knowledge.* (p. 305) Our life is short and the way to science long, so who wants to reach perfection in science should start with reading in early youth. Children of nobles and kings should rather know how to read and write in order to be able to use prudence and intellect later. This has to prevent too that *they will become tyrants, once they will placed in the position of rulers* (p. 306)

2.8 (p. 306, 5-310) [p. 306, 5-308, 5: Giles explains the nobleness of the content of the seven liberal sciences: Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric, Music, with which Aristotle deals in *Politics*, VIII, Algebra, Geometry and Astronomy.] Natural philosophy, which teaches the nature of things, is nobler. Metaphysics, which discusses God and substance in a scientific way, is much nobler and theology, about God and the angels, *is by far and incomparably more noble and worthier than all the other ones. Moreover the practical sciences, Ethics (--), Economics (--), and Politics (--), are very useful and necessary for the sons of freemen and nobles.* (p. 308/9) Then there are still Perspective, Medicine and Law, which are usually considered as auxiliary sciences, successively to geometry, natural philosophy and politics. *Now that the sciences are divided in this way, it is obvious over which science the sons of nobles and certainly those of kings and princes should sweat.* (p. 309/10) The sons of kings and princes that are going to be governors of the empire have to be instructed first in the belief and then in the sciences which tell them how to reign and govern: the practical sciences. *The rest of the sciences they should know in as far as these are auxiliary ones to the practical sciences* (p. 310). They should therefore know the grammar of the language in which the practical sciences are written [Latin DN]. This helps to read and write secret messages too. The sons of the nobles, who will become fighters, however, *should in the first place sweat over reading and writing in their own language.* (p. 310) Future governors should moreover acquire a basic knowledge of logic and rhetoric and know in how far music contributes the good habits, which is possible according to The Philosopher.

[2.9 (p. 311-314, 5): Giles argues that sons of nobles need a tutor and explains the ideal character traits and experience of this pedagogue. Not summarized DN]

2.10 (p. 314, 5-317, 5) *At the end of Politics, VII The Philosopher teaches that older boys should be bridled as to their talking, seeing and hearing.* (p. 314) Usually they have three problems with talking: they often talk dirty, they lie and they talk without thinking beforehand. The problem is that this easily will become a habit and once adults will do the same; moreover dirty language leads to dirty deeds later, as The Philosopher says, because the memory of the fun experienced with the foul talk sticks. Mendacity according to the Philosopher in *Ethics*, IV is something bad and has to be avoided per se, so older boys have to be brought to *sticking to the truth, which according to the Philosopher on the same Ethics, IV is good and praiseworthy.* (p.315) Finally, because young man are inexperienced and do not know much, they easily say things which they later regret. So one should older boys teach to think, before they start talking. As to the bridle to their seeing, the pedagogues and teachers have to watch not only what young man see but also their manner of looking. Care should be taken that they do not see bad acts in actual life, because, *as the Philosopher says in Politics, VII, all that comes first we love more.* (p. 315) But this is not enough! Because one remembers so well and also desires what one has seen in one's youth, *The Philosopher (ibidem) forbids older boys to see the indecent things on sculptures and paintings, e.g. if there are nude women depicted on them, they should not be shown to older boys.* (p. 316) Then, at that age, where almost everything seen is new, one is inclined to look around in order to see everything, which for kings and princes is very improper, because wandering eyes suggest frivolity, fussiness and scantiness. *So those who are going to reign and govern from early youth on have to be taught a mature glance.* (p. 316) As to their hearing, again two matters have to be watched: what they hear and whom they hear. That they hear shameful bad things has to be prevented, again because from this will come shameful acts later, as the Philosopher says. *In the same way should be taken care that young man listen to good and respectable men and are forbidden to listen to slanderers and indecent people.* (p. 317)

[2.11 (p. 317, 5- 319): Giles explains in 2.11 what older boys should be learned about the manner of eating. Not summarized DN]]

2.12 (p. 320-322, 5) *We have earlier said that the age group of the older boys is maximally inclined to a lack of self-control. (--) Self-control has to be applied in three areas: food, drinks and sex (Lat.: venerea) (p. 320)* So older boys should not only abstain from gluttony they also should stay sober. By soberness they prevent three bad consequences. Firstly too much wine incites to sexual acts, because the body becomes too hot. Secondly it disturbs the brains, which makes that one become easily offended. *Thirdly it causes dispute and discord (p. 321)* Because older boys are lovers of insults as The Philosopher says in his *Rhetoric*, II drinking should be forbidden to them. *Now still remains to be looked into how older boys should behave as to sex and the marriage that has to be solemnized. (321).* They have to be instructed in such a way that they are not licentious. *All sexual acts except in marriage are against the precept of reason. (p. 321)* So they have to be brought to sticking to their wives also. As to the age of marriage The Philosopher says in his *Politics*, VII that girls should marry at 18 and men at 36. *The desiring power, however, is full grown at 21. If sons marry under that age they are provoked to licentiousness and their growth is hindered, as the Philosopher tells in the same fragment of Politics (p. 322), but after 21 men may marry at the age that suits them.*

2.13 (p. 322, 5-325) *Play^{xviii}, as The Philosopher proves in Politics, VIII is necessary in life, which for now can be shown in two ways. (p. 322)* Firstly, the mind cannot stay unoccupied and when it becomes empty of licit thoughts, it wanders towards bad ones. *That is why the Philosopher says in Politics, VIII that play is some way distraction (--). (p. 322)* Secondly, between periods of labor leisure should be inserted so that the work goals eventually will be reached more easily. This explains The Philosopher in *Politics*, VIII So boys should be instructed to have games, be them used on a moderate scale and they should be decent ones too, *because the bad ones should be forbidden (p. 323)* as the Philosopher wants in *Politics*, VII. A second subject is the proper gestures. *The gestures are said to be the movements of the body, from which are judged the movements of the soul. (p. 323)* One should not be able to deduce from the movements of the body the rapture of the soul, the foolishness of the mind or the intemperance of the desire. For instance when speaking, one should not use feet, hands, eyes, etc. at the same time. Discipline in this respect is mainly a matter of focusing on the member used, whenever it is employed. *So older boys should be taught to possess such gestures and to use the movements of their members to serve the activities they have in mind. (p. 324)* *Clothes can be ordered according to three (purposes): pleasure, utility or honor. (p. 324)* If we use clothes for pleasure they are delicate and soft; if for utility they are thick or thin and if for honor they are beautiful and elegant. It is indecent to care too much about delicacy and comfort of clothes and pleasure in general, because by this attitude one is brought lightly to sensuality and weakness of flesh. *Women seem to be so more than men because they are not constant and soft and easily jump into sensuality (p. 324/5)* Men become timid by soft clothing, where especially older boys should be eager to fight. The utility of clothes - their second purpose- differs for men and women, winter and summer, old and young. To determine if clothes are honorable, finally, *one has to take into consideration the customs of the fatherland and the status of the persons concerned. (p. 325)*

2.14 (p. 326-327) Older boys should be kept from bad company because they are easily influenced; as typical followers of their passions are inclined to do the bad; love company too much and finally are credulous. That they are easily influenced can be explained by the fact that the soul follows the composition of the body. If the last is still soft and pliable, as is the case with boys and older boys, the soul is this too. So the habits of their comrades are easier printed on their souls than on those of elder people. As to passions, the second soft spot, *one is easily brought to whatever one is inclined and older boys are inclined to the bad (p. 326), as I have written in the part about Ethics.* Thirdly, older boys love friends and prefer comrades more than the other age groups (as is to be found in *Rhetoric*, II), because for them it is a pleasure to form groups. Therefore too bad company should be forbidden to them. Fourthly older boys are too credulous and forbidden pleasures easily appear good to them. So they are easily convinced by their comrades to do the things that appear to be good but actually are bad.

[2.15 (p. 328-330): Giles explains and varies on *Politics*, VII, xv about the education of the children of the first age group (0-7 years).Not summarized DN]

2.16 (p. 331-333) Because of the individual development of each child one should not apply the division of the youth in septennaries too strictly. In the second septennary, from the 7th till the 14th year three aspects of the government of sons have to be looked into: body, will and intellect. *The basic division of man is the one in body and soul but the most important powers of the soul are intellect and desire. One therefore has to watch in children three things; firstly the situation of the body, secondly the one of the will and thirdly the one of the intellect. To get their body well disposed, they have to be brought to practice the right exercises and motions. In order to get their will well ordered, they should be induced to the proper virtues and acts of virtue. But to get their intellect perfect, they are to be instructed in the proper sciences.* (p. 331) So science, virtue and exercises are important when it comes to the government of children. *Till they are fourteen the boys should get used to heavier work and more difficult exercises than in the first period* (p. 332), be them not yet of a military character or really heavy ones. The Philosophers suggest in *Politics* VIII that this way the growth of the body is not hindered. As to virtue, *one has to know that The Philosopher writes in Politics, V that it would be a pity not to instruct boys in virtue and not to teach them to observe the useful laws* (332) The reader should be aware of this for The Philosopher inquires in *Politics*, VIII, if the will or the intellect of boys should be formed first. The will does come first! He proves that in first instance one has to make sure that the desires of the boys are channeled into the right direction. This is especially important in the second septennary, because the consequence of an unorganized desire is an unorganized will and a well-organized will is going to be necessary in the following stage in order to be able to develop the intellect. The proper approach in this regard is to concentrate oneself on the enforcement of the opposite of the bad habits which older boys use to acquire.

This emphasis on virtue for the second septennary does not mean that in this stage one can forget the development of the intellect. *No, the boys should already in the second period be instructed in grammar, which is the language of science, in logic, which is more a way of knowing than a science and in music practice, which is a kind of modulence of voices.* p. 333)

2.17 (p. 334-338,5) [(p. 334-335,5): Giles summarizes chapters 2.15 and 2.16.DN] *But in the third septennary, that is to say from the fourteenth year onwards, one has to try to achieve three things: a well-disposed body, a well-ordered desire and a well illuminated intellect.* (p. 335) As to the further education of the body, *The Philosopher says also in his Politics that till their fourteenth year the boys have to get used to the lighter tasks, but after that have to take on heavier tasks.* (p. 335) So one should now start with wrestling and other military exercises, which are of course useful for the soldiers to be. *Where everybody who wants to lead a political life [in opposition to a clerical life DN] in some way should do heavy work for the defense of the state,* (p. 335) everybody should get accustomed to working with his muscles in order to be prepared. As to the well-ordered desire, the older youth seems to make two mistakes: presumption, in other words to think that they can and may dominate because at this age they start to use their ratio, and secondly too much interest in sex. Older boys should not be presumptuous but listen to their parents. *The Philosopher in Politics, VIII touches on three short reasons why children should remain submissive and listen to parents and older people* (p. 346): (1) it is for their own good; (2) they learn from the example which is good because they later have to teach the young in their turn and (3) who wants to become a master first has to learn to be a subject, *reason why the Philosopher says that nobody is a good prince, who has not earlier been a subject.* (p. 337). As to the second mistake, older boys between 14 and 21 have to be persuaded to abstain from sex *totally or to restrict themselves to the use of their own wife.* (p. 337). [(p. 337, 5-338, 5): Giles repeats chapter 2.7]

2.18 (p. 338, 5 -340, 5) Especially older boys who want a secular life should practice bodily exercises to avoid idleness. It is moreover a good preparation for their military activities. A distinction between them has to be made here, *because the sons of princes and kings have to do bodily exercise in lesser*

degree and the first born who are going to govern have to do less bodily labor than other older boys (p. 339). The point here is that *The Philosopher* writes in *Politics, VIII* that *bodily work and intellectual contemplation seem to stand in each other's way*. (p. 339) The reason for this is found in *De Anima, II*, where one comes across the proverb 'A weak body has a capable mind'. So the bodily labor, which makes the body hard, hinders the acumen of the mind. He therefore quite rightly writes in *Physics, VIII* that the soul is prudent when one is quietly sitting. As future governors of the state they should become more prudent than bellicose because in a king practical wisdom is of more worth than war weapons. They should not neglect all bodily exercise but give priority to *diligently studying the moral sciences so that they get to understand the habits of people and how they use to acts* (p. 340) For them it is proper to contemplate the good habits in the kingdom and to listen frequently to the stories about the acts of the predecessors, who reigned over the kingdom well.

2.19 (p. 340, 5-342) After the coverage of the care for sons, the care for daughters has to be discussed too. A short treatise will be enough because almost sufficiently has been said in *About the government of the wife*[Part I above DN]. *Where wives have to be chaste and honest and abstinent and sober^{xix} this goes for daughters too*. (p. 340) But a few specific rules have to be added. *The first of them is that it should be forbidden to them to wander around the house*.(p. 341) There are three reasons for this prohibition: it takes away from the daughters the opportunity for doing evil, prevents them from becoming impudent and precludes that they become lascivious and lewd. As to the first reason, with the pleasures of the senses *man is inclined to do the bad whenever he can according to the Philosopher in his Rhetoric, II*, (p. 341) If one wants to conserve purity and innocence one should be aware of the proverbial 'the opportunity to steal makes a thief' and eliminate the opportunities for evildoing. Certainly for women, because they are inclined to the bad more than man, *because they lack the use of reason more* (p. 341). This inclination to evildoing goes for the girls as well, be it more for the older girls than the young ones. As to the second reason, by going out girls meet men and hear their lies and observe their shamelessness and think that these are the norms and therefore start to practice them too. As to the danger of lascivious and lewd behavior, *by keeping girls at home one prevents them from becoming wild*. (p. 342). One can easily observe that very wild animals, once used to man, let themselves be touched and caressed. If girls are not permitted to become wild, they will more difficultly be inclined to lasciviousness and lewd behavior.

2.20 (p. 343-344) *In Rhetoric, I The Philosopher recommends to women love for a working attitude*.(p. 343) There are three reasons for all commoners, which even are more valid for the nobles and maximally for kings and princes. Firstly, *our life cannot be lead without any pleasures as the Philosopher writes in Ethics, X*. (p. 343). One has to take up work in which one finds pleasure. *Because all have fun with their own works and all love the results of them - like The Philosopher wants in Ethics. IX, that women may have fun with some allowed works of their liking - , women should be directed at some allowed and honest works that fits them better than men*. (p. 343/4) Secondly, because the males already take the governing responsibilities and the mind wants to be occupied, the women who desire to occupy their minds become easily enthusiast about the wrong things, certainly because their use of the ratio is less than those of men, as already often said. This wrong direction of their thoughts is avoided by daily work. Thirdly the result of their work is useful. *Women can never give themselves to practices that are allowed, if not at the same time some good comes from the more outside work or the outcome is some good disposition of their internal mind*. (p. 344) One should take care that the women are good and virtuous, what the Spartans had forgotten as Aristotle tells in *Rhetoric I*. If one asks to which works they should be motivated, the answer is that this depends. Weaving, sewing and spinning are the usual occupations for women. If the traditions of a country or a high position, however, forbid this, than they should be stimulated to read.

[2.21 (p. 345-346): Giles elaborates the necessity to teach girls taciturnity, in line with chapters 1.19 en 1.24. Not summarized DN]

Book II, part 3 in which is discussed how kings and princes should govern their ministerials and the rest of the family

3.1 (p. 348-351, 5) *To this part, which deals with the government of the ministerials and the rest of the family^{xx} can be connected the material about those things that supply the bodily needs and those that bring about their conservation and their being sufficient for a living.* (p. 348) Examples of them are the decency of the buildings, the number of coins and the amount of other possessions.(348) *That the wise pater familias, or the learned helmsman (Lat.: gubernator) of the family^{xxi} should look into all these subjects and that they are connected is sufficiently shown by The Philosopher in Politics, I.* (p. 349) [p. 349-351: Giles proves that this connection indeed is shown by The Philosopher in *Politics, I*. Not summarized DN]

3.2 (p. 351, 5-353, 5) The Philosopher says in *Politics, I* too, that all organs for the navigation of the house can be distinguished in two kinds: those with a soul, like slaves and ministerials and those without a soul, like houses, implements and money, like in the art of navigation one has the rowers and the oars. *Having distinguished both kinds of tools [inanimate and animate DN], now has to be shown how they relate to each other* (p. 352). Because the house is natural and in nature everything is put into an order, the possessions with a soul are higher than those without one, as the Philosopher explains in *Politics, I*. [p. 352-353. Giles shows how Aristotle explains that masters and overseers need ministerials and slaves, to get into motion the tools without a soul. Not summarized DN]]

3.3 (p. 353, 5- 356, 5) *First will be shown what houses (Lat.: domus) and what living quarters (Lat.: habitationes) kings and princes and in general all commoners should have* (p. 353). That precisely kings and princes should have admirable and nicely built living quarters is proven by The Philosopher by showing the necessity of royal magnificence and of admiration by their people. He shows in *Ethics, IV* in the chapter about magnificence that this virtue is expressed by huge spending on houses. The other citizen however should have more or less conspicuous houses, as corresponds to their fortune. To this comes that The Philosopher writes in *Politics, VI* that the people should admire their governors, because this prevents them from revolts and as he writes in *Ethics, III* from opposition. Large and beautiful houses make them admire their king or prince. A third reason why their houses should be large is that *where the riches are many, there are also many people who eat from them* (355), which requires housing many ministerials. [(p. 355, 5 -356, 5) Giles reproduces from the *Opus agriculturae* of the agronomist Palladius, paragraph I, 3 that the air of the region where the house of a king or prince is going to be built, should be healthy.]

[3.4 (p. 356, 5-358) Giles reproduces from the *Opus agriculturae* of Palladius paragraphs I,16, I,17 and I, 18, in which the late Roman agronomist explains that the water of the farm should be pure and the farm should be situated properly. Not summarized DN]

3.5 (p. 359-361, 5) *Along three ways one can find out that property is something natural.* (p. 359). The first way, coming from the necessity of making a living, shows that if man is by nature a political being, then the things that make being political possible are natural too. Now according to The Philosopher in *Politics, I* the property of goods is necessary, if one would like to lead a political life. So the property of goods to satisfy the necessities of life is natural for man. The second way, coming from the dignity of the human being, shows that The Philosopher writes in *Politics, I* that man fights a just war against the beasts when they do not obey him, because man by nature dominates animals. Like man by nature dominates the animals he dominates by nature the other exterior things as well, which would not be the case if property were not in some way natural. The final way to find this out, coming from the workings of nature, shows that by nature the imperfect beings, animals, are being fed already directly after their procreation, so nature certainly feeds the perfect animal, man. *That is why The Philosopher says in Politics, I that the things that we accept as food are given us by nature.* (p. 360) To this has to be added that we are in a way the goal of everything, as The Philosopher says in his *Physica, II*. *To have mastership over the external goods is therefore in a way natural to us.*(p. 360) So those people who refuse mastership over the exterior goods, like priests, are celestial people, who choose a way of living above the people. *So it is natural for man, just in order to be to be a human being, like The Philosopher wants in Politics, I, to have the possession and mastership of certain*

exterior goods because of the sufficiency of living. (p. 361). Without foodstuff our lives would not take long.

3.6 (p. 361, 5-363, 5) Socrates and Plato advocated common property, even (what is worse) to possess women and children in common, as Aristotle writes in *Politics*, II. Well, if most men were not inclined to the bad it would be proper that in a state the possessions were held in common. As things stand, *it is useful that in a state the citizens enjoy private property* (--) (p. 362). We can select from several places in *Politics* three arguments for private property. Firstly, man always loves himself so much that he always is more concerned about his own good than the good of others. We see that with common property the possessions are easily consumed and destroyed and moreover that the citizens are not easily prepared to cultivate the lands, reason why the city becomes poor and the citizen cannot provide for the necessities of life. So, private property prevents inertia. Secondly, common property causes much strife. Aristotle in *Ethics*, VIII shows that even between brothers, who are in principle natural friends, many quarrels arise about an inheritance. So, private property prevents quarrels. Finally private property prevents disorder and confusion. It is efficient to give the different tasks to one's own ministerials, where with common property the distribution of tasks might become a problem, according to The Philosopher in *Politics*, II, for some will avoid their assignments and not all tasks will probably be attributed. So, private property takes away disorder and confusion.

3.7 (p. 363, 5-365) People do not use the exterior goods in an identical way and their ways of living are different. In *Politics*, I The Philosopher distinguishes four basic ways of making a living: agriculture, pasturing, hunting and fishing, which sometimes are combined. Some ways of making a living are permitted and others are illicit. Nature gave us domestic animals and plants to live from them, so pasturing and agriculture are allowed. Fishing and hunting are licit ways of making a living too, because they are a matter of a just war against the wild animals. Making a living from thieving, however, is not permitted, because in principle the fighting of man against man is not a just war. One should not deduce from the fact that The Philosopher tells that war against the barbarians is always just, that the citizens can fight a just war against the people in the countryside and steal their property. It is therefore rather important, that commoners and much more kings and princes, *if they want to govern their house righteously, know which are the ways to make a living, and which of them are permitted and which forbidden: because nobody is able to live virtuously, when he uses possessions or exterior goods illicitly.* (p. 365)

3.8 (p. 366-368, 5) *Generally spoken people seem to miss something, when it comes to the appetite for possessions and the desire for riches.* (p. 366) In *Politics*, I The Philosopher offers a double-reason why the desire for riches is infinite. The one reason is that the will is not ordered: life is corporeal and lascivious, without self-control by the will. To satisfy one's lusts, which seems maximally made possible by money, one thinks never to have enough possessions and money. The second reason is that the mind estimates the goal wrongly.. The Philosopher in *Politics*, I explains, that a goal is different from a means. A goal is aspired for without any limit, while a means has a limit and this limit is the goal concerned. *Those who see riches as a goal want money without any limit. But we can show in two ways that it is not a part of the navigation of the house to strive for infinite possessions.* (p. 367) In the first place nature provides animals with just as much food as they need and not more, as the amount of milk of the mothers for their babies shows. The governor of the house has to follow nature. So the governor of the house should not gather riches but provide his house with just as much food as it needs. In the second place possessions are a means for governing the house. The Philosopher says in *Politics*, I that no art has infinite instruments, and because possessions are instruments, no governor of the house should look for an infinite amount of them. *It is therefore right that all commoners, and certainly kings and princes are satisfied with as much possessions and riches as the needs which come with their status requires.* (p. 367). Certainly a king should make a proper estimation of his goal, because the people have to admire him and would not do that, if he aims at the wrong goals.

[In chapters 3.9-3.12 (p. 368-380) Gilles reproduces and comments on Aristotle's *Politics*, I, 1236b 40-1259a 37. In the meantime he transposes the money theory of Aristotle to the thirteenth century,

without saying so. I left these chapters out, while they nowadays are considered to belong to political economics.DN]

3.13 (p. 380, 5-382) *That servitude is something natural and that it is by nature appropriate for some to be subjects to others, proves Aristotle in Politics, I in four ways from four comparisons.*(380) (a) Never more voices make harmony, of not one takes the lead. And the elements would not be productive if not earth dominated the four elements. So if already the things without a soul have when they form a unity have a steering as well as a following principle, it is natural in the political society that some are leaders and others followers. (b) With animals the soul dominates the body and the body cannot direct itself to perform the necessary tasks. *As many people are related to other people as the body to the soul, therefore these many people are by nature slaves* (p. 381) They are missing prudence and intellect and they should be reigned by the wise. In politics also the wise should govern but *it sometimes happens that the unknowing reign more than the wise* (p. 381). This occurs because of a perversity of the political system, like the pest in a human. (c) Man dominates the animals by nature and one sees many house animals, like dogs and horses, perform tasks, which are conceived by man and that these animals are not able to do them on their own. *As the industrious relate to the enterprising persons as animals to people and as those who miss prudence cannot steer themselves, it is natural that the ignorant are subject to these prudent people and that it are the last ones who steer and save their industry* (p. 382) (d) *We see that the husband, to the degree that his ratio is better, by nature dominates the wife, about whom The Philosopher says in Politics, I that she has an invalid judgment* (p. 382). So one sees how men are subjects to those, who do use their ratio better.

[3.14 (p. 383-384): Giles argues, using *Politics*, I, 3 that slavery has to be regulated in positive law. Not summarized DN]

3.15 (385-386). *We can say that four kinds of ministerials exist:* (385) (1) ministerials by nature: the strangers who do not know how to behave themselves, and have a shortage of goods of the soul and therefore deserve to be commanded, (2) ministerials by law: those who proved worthless in war; and by law have to serve or attend to the master and his guests, (3) ministerials by conduct: mercenaries, who get a stipend for fighting but (4) *good and virtuous are the ministerials by love and virtue* (p. 385). As a matter of principle in a ministerial function have to work people who aim primarily at the good and not in the first place at money. Ministerials rather should be rewarded according to merit. *Those who are inclined to serve out of virtue and love for the good have not to be governed by way of a slavish government but in a paternalistic or regal way.* (p. 386) This kind of ministerials must receive more honor and money rewards than the other ones. The first reason is that the more valuable someone is, the more gifts should be attributed to him. These ministerials by their love of the honorable and the good are more valuable than those by conduct who are motivated by money and those by nature, who were captured and certainly than foreigners. The second reason is that they are found closer to the highest authority, just like the immediate environment gets more water from a well. ^{xxii}

3.16 (387-389, 5) *Because the duties are divided over the ministerials in such a way that some are responsible for the table, others for the mass of horses, and others for other tasks, as the dimension of the house requires, here three things will be paid attention to: the organization of the duties (Lat.: ordo ministrandi), the ease with which the tasks are performed (Lat.: facilitas exequendi) and the nature of those who are acting as ministerials (Lat.: conditio ministrantium).* (p. 387) As to the first point, *one duty should never be given to more servants, unless these very servants are put under one person, a kind of architect, whose function is to overarch the commissioned duty.* (p. 387) The reason why is shown in *Politics*, II, which says that when there are too many servants, always some task will be forgotten. *Such a multitude has to be reduced to one* (p. 387). The multitude of entities in the cosmos functions well also because of the one God who puts them in an order. *This model is maximally applicable at the navigation of the houses of kings* (p. 387), for here many duties have to be distributed over many servants. As to the second point, the ease with which the tasks are performed seems to be a matter of not committing several tasks to one and the same person. In *Politics*, IV the Philosopher explains that small and large states exist and that in small states the duties are simpler and

there one person can perform several of them. The same goes for small houses. *Here one person may be table ministerial as well as doorman* (p. 388). This rule of committing only one task to one person is valid in large houses with many ministerials and with duties which have to be paid maximal attention to, like those of princes and kings. Thirdly should be looked into the nature of those who are acting as ministerials. If they perform a given task badly this usually is caused because they are deceivers or lack intellect or prudence. *Servants should be loyal and prudent* (p. 390). Loyalty is a matter of the right will, a will which is not prepared to cheat. Prudence is a matter of an active intellect, which prevents from defrauding by ignorance. Loyalty we get to know from daily practice, because one cannot look into one's heart: if somebody has been loyal in several successive functions, he probably will stay loyal in the next one too. *Prudence, however, we can get to know, by checking what we have mentioned in the first book: if somebody remembers, foresees, is cautious and is circumspect and the rest we mentioned he must have a reputation of prudence* (p. 389).

3.17 (p. 389, 5-391, 5) The instruction of kings and princes deals to a large extent with honorable and prudent behavior and this kind of behavior is finding expression by the clothing of their ministerials too. *Five aspects have to be taken into consideration (because they are relevant here)* (p. 389). Their clothing should be appropriate, and less magnificent than the garments of the king, which should be magnificent as The Philosopher says in *Politics*, VII. Next, it should be uniform; this way showing that the wearers are servants of the king. Thirdly their dress should express the status of the persons concerned, for instance show if they are a priest or layman or have a high or a low function at the court.^{xxiii} Then the dress should follow the customs of the country, *unless these customs are too perverse* (p. 191). People like this, because they heartily follow habits acquired in their youth. *That is why Politics, VII at the end tells that we love the first things most*. Finally the seasons should be observed and the clothing of the ministerials should be varied according to them.

[3.18 (p 391, 5-394): Giles explains that two types of nobility exist, one by birth and the other one by merit. And after that explanation he shows the typical noble behavior: courtliness (Lat.: curialitas). Not summarized DN]

3.19 (p. 395-398,5) For kings and nobles and regents in general the proper way of dealing with the ministerials *seems to consist of more or less five elements: (1) properly committing the duties to them; (2) making them taking care for the duties attributed to them properly, (3) to know how to communicate with them, (4) (to know) in what way secrets (--) are shared with them and (5) to know in what way they should receive benefits and how favors should be granted to them* (p. 395). Ad 1: One has to find out the most important requirement for a specific task. If loyalty is the most important requirement for entrusting to somebody an office, the presence of this character trait has to be checked in practice with small assignments and then gradually more important ones. Aristotle said this in *Ethics*, VIII by way of a proverb. In *Rhetoric*, II is suggested also that every step has to be evaluated. *Given that they in some small magistracy have behaved themselves prudently and loyally, they should not immediately assume too high offices but gradually and during a fixed period get experience, before they rise to something high*. (p. 396) This then is how duties are committed. Rests to look at how should be taken care that the attributed duties are performed. It should not be done by the king as in *Politics*, I is said.. For this function a manager ((Lat.: procurator) should be nominated. A king should be concerned about the common good and about governing his kingdom. Ad 3: Communication is more or less dealt with in *Ethics* IV, where The Philosopher tells that a King towards the humble should behave magnanimously as well as austere but austerity should be applied moderately as can be read in *Politics*, V, because otherwise he might lose the respect of his servants. *In everything (as is told in Ethics) one has to look for the middle and avoid the extremes* (p. 397) Ad 4: If he does share his policy with his personnel depends on the kind of relationship. With natural slaves no secrets or policy should be shared, because they are ignorant and lack reason, as the Philosopher says in *Politics*, I, 5. Then, *no policy should be shared with the slaves by law, who usually are driven more by curiosity than by love* (p. 397) nor with mercenaries, who are driven more by money than by love for the prince Only the servants from love might be trusted, but still depending on the circumstances. Ad 5: The distributing of gifts is a simple matter. Kings should be liberal and distribute gifts to all servants according to their merits.

3.20 (p.398, 5- 400, 5) In two ways it can be shown that at the tables of kings and princes, and of the nobles in general, those who are eating as well as those who serve should not talk too much: It is against the natural order and it contradicts the goodness of morals. *In Politics, I is said that something is made according to nature, when one tool is deployed for one job.* (p. 398) One function should stop when the other one begins. That is why, when according to The Philosopher in *De Anima*, III the tongue has two functions: talking and tasting, it is against nature not to stop talking, when we begin to eat. Secondly the wine makes those who sit at the tables talkative. It is proper for kings and princes to be moderate and keep the natural order at their tables. If those who are present are talking loudly and through each other this order is disrupted. *Therefore at the tables of kings and princes useful books should be read out aloud* (--). (p. 399) There are two types of them. One has books that that relate the praiseworthy customs of the reign or the praiseworthy deeds of predecessors of the king, especially the holy and religious ones. *But let be read at the table the book About the government of princes, so that also the princes self are instructed, how they should reign and others is taught how they should obey the princes.* (p. 399/400) These works, then, or other useful ones in the vernacular should be read out aloud at the table of kings and princes.

End of the second book of The government of princes, in which is discussed the government of the house

ⁱ The *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle was translated in Latin for the first time in the twelfth century, be it only the first and the second book. In the beginning of the thirteenth century it was translated for the second time. Of this version only the first book and a few fragments are remnant. In 1246-1247 Robert Grosseteste translated the *Nicomachean Ethics* together with a set of Greek commentaries, which made the *Nicomachean Ethics* understandable for the medieval scholars. This version will become the standard throughout the Middle Ages. See Georg Wieland, *The reception and interpretation of Aristotle's Ethics* in: *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge, etc. (Cambridge University Press) 1988 (paperback) p.657.

ⁱⁱ Jean Dunbabin, *The reception and interpretation of Aristotle's Politics*, In: *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* Cambridge, etc. (Cambridge University Press) 1988 (paperback) p. 723.

ⁱⁱⁱ Thomas of Aquino (Lat.: Thomas Aquinas), was an Italian Dominican friar, who is considered the greatest theologian and philosopher of the Roman Catholic Church. He was the father of Thomism, an attempt to synthesize Aristotelian philosophy with the principles of the faith, which was accepted in 1879 by the Roman Catholic Church as hers. Thomas had to stop with the comment on the *Politics* of Aristotle in 1272, because he was going to set up a Studium Generale for the Dominican order in Naples and left the University of Paris.

^{iv} Jean Dunbabin, o.c. p. 728: *The translation of van Moerbeke of Politics was not very clear but by the comment of Thomas -Peter (Peter of Auvergne, after Thomas Aquinas, made Politics, III-VIII comprehensible DN) on Politics the job of rendering it intelligible was done, and it did not have to be done again. Many, if not most, of later medieval commentators on Aristotle's Politics plagiarised it wholesale.*

^v This is a second order of Augustinian monks (O.E.S.A.), founded officially in 1256 by the merger of quite some Italian smaller orders of hermits. It is an order of mendicants. The other one, an order which unites the canons who live under the rule of St Augustine, was already founded by St Augustine before 400.

^{vi} The bishop of Paris, Etienne Templier, not only condemned 219 theses of theology and philosophy from Aristotle, Averroes and other philosophers but specifically 52 propositions of the *Sententiae* (*Sentences*, brief moral saying from sources) of Giles of Rome.

^{vii} There he wrote another famous work: *About the ecclesiastical power* (Lat.: *De potestate ecclesiastica*) in which he vindicates the rights of the pope.

^{viii} Part I has no title, what part II and part III do have.

^{ix} *Domus ergo de qua principaliter intenditur in morali negocio non est ipsum aedificium. sed est communicatio demesticarum personarum, (--). Spectat ad oeconomicam (--). determinare, prout habet ordinem ad domum, quae est communitas personarum.*

^x Aristotle writes (1162a 23) instead: 'thus they supply each other's wants' (Gr.: επαρκουσιν ουν αλληλοις).

^{xi} Valerius Maximus (fl. 30 AD) wrote a work with historical anecdotes: *Factorum et dictorum memorabilium IX libri* (*Nine books of memorable deeds and sayings.*). It was popular in the Middle Ages.

^{xii} Here Giles refers one time to Plato, inserting 12th century cosmology, which was still strongly influenced by neo-Platonism.

^{xiii} The intended six female virtues are: taciturnity, stability, chastity, honesty, abstinence and soberness. The last four together add up to moderation.

^{xiv} Giles refers to Andronicus of Rhodes (fl. 60 BC). After Athens was sacked by the Roman general Lucius Cornelius Sulla in 86 BC, all the schools of philosophy in Athens, amongst which the one of Aristotle were badly disrupted. In 84BC Sulla brought the writings of Aristotle from the library of Appellicon to Rome. Here they became collected by Andronicus of Rhodes. This author, being the 11th governor of the peripatetic school published a new edition of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus.

^{xv} This must be a writing error. Aristotle has *την κτησιν των απσυχων* (the possession of the inanimate property: *possessionem inanimatorum*) and Giles writes: *passionem inanimatorum*

^{xvi} In this chapter Aristotle is 4 times cited from different works. Here I have not shown these citations, because they are more or less dragged into the text and do not enforce the arguments that Giles brings forward.

^{xvii} Giles here writes *in liberalibus disciplinis* (in the liberal subjects) but at the end of this chapter *in literalibus disciplinis* (in the subjects of the letters: reading and writing). I cannot imagine that Giles wants to say here that young children should become educated into the complete trivium; grammar, rhetoric and logic, let go into the quadrivium: arithmetica, geometria, musica and astronomia. *In liberalibus disciplinis* therefore seems to me to be a printing error here. Actually Giles discusses the liberal subjects in his next chapter about higher learning.

^{xviii} Giles merges here play (*ludus, παιδια*) and leisure (*otium, σχολη*), which Aristotle distinguishes in VIII, II, 4-6.

^{xix} This pertains successively to only having sex with their husband, refraining from flirting, controlling themselves with food and refusing to drink alcohol.

^{xx} Mind that Giles here writes *ministerials and the rest of the family*. It is quite possible that one has to read *rest of the family* literally, because he wants to refer here to the members of the family who are working in different regions in name of the king.

^{xxi} Note that Giles uses the terms *to navigate* and *helmsman* frequently, now in part III he writes about managing the goods and governing the ministerials. Already in chapter I, 3one has met the expression *to navigate the goods of the house* (*gubernare res domesticas*).

^{xxii} Giles falls back here on *On Divine names* (*De divinis nominibus*), 4 of Ps. Dionysios the Areopagite (fl. 500). This book was a part of his corpus, which was completely accepted in the Eastern churches and has influenced many mystics in the Western ones. This is the only place in his economics for princes where Giles uses a catholic authority.

^{xxiii} Giles argues more broadly here and cites Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII.